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CORPORATE OFFICER LIABILITY FOR FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTE VIOLATIONS 
Andrew M. Goldberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal prosecution of corporate officers for violations of envi-
ronmental statutes increased tremendously in the 1980s.1 During 
fiscal year 1985, for example, corporate officers were sentenced to a 
total of less than six years in prison and were fined $560,000 for 
criminal violations of environmental statutes.2 In fiscal year 1988, 
however, corporate officers convicted of environmental crimes re-
ceived sentences totalling thirty-nine years of imprisonment and 
approximately seven million dollars in fines. 3 
Much of this increase has been the direct result of the creation in 
1981 of a new Office of Criminal Enforcement within the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA)4 and a special Environmental 
Crimes Unit within the Land and Natural Resources Division of the 
Department of Justice. 5 These divisions were created specifically to 
investigate and prosecute environmental criminals.6 A former Assis-
tant Attorney General in charge of the Land and Natural Resources 
Division of the Department of Justice has said that it is the continu-
• Articles Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental 
Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 337 (June 9, 1989). 
2 Id. (citing Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, Environmental Crimes Section, to Joseph 
Block, Chief Environmental Crimes Section (May 5, 1989». 
3 Id. These statistics include sentences for some non-corporate officer defendants. 
4 See The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Rema~n 
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ing policy of the Justice Department to prosecute the highest-rank-
ing responsible corporate officers. 7 
Most environmental statutes are what the United States Supreme 
Court has labeled public welfare statutes. 8 The purpose of public 
welfare statutes is to protect the general public from dangers that 
can be prevented and controlled. 9 The fifth amendment due process 
clause usually requires that criminal intent be a necessary element 
for conviction of a crime. 10 Most crimes, therefore, require criminal 
intent,l1 but the Supreme Court has stated that the absence of a 
knowledge requirement in public welfare statutes does not violate a 
defendant's due process rights. 12 Courts must construe the legisla-
tive intent behind a given public welfare statute to determine what 
element of knowledge, if any, must be proven to convict an individual 
defendant for violating a public welfare statute. 13 
Although most environmental public welfare statutes contain a 
knowledge requirement, some impose a strict-liability standard in-
stead. 14 Regardless of whether a statute imposes a knowledge re-
quirement or a strict-liability standard, the government's burden of 
proof does not vary greatly because a jury can infer knowledge from 
the surrounding circumstances. 15 Courts generally have imposed a 
high duty of care on corporate officers while holding that knowledge 
of statutory violations can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 16 
7 Id. at 10,480. "It has been, and will continue to be, Justice Department policy to conduct 
environmental criminal investigations with an eye toward identifying, prosecuting, and con-
victing the highest ranking, truly responsible corporate officials." Id. 
8' See Comment, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did They 
Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 61 (1988). 
9 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (involved the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits the sale of misbranded or adulterated drugs); United 
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (involved a violation of the Narcotic Act, which 
regulated the sale of certain drugs). 
10 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 252; Comment, supra note 8, at 61 (citing R. PERKINS, PERKINS 
ON CRIMINAL LAW 785 n.11 (2d ed. 1969». See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246 (1952). 
11 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 167 (1878); United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941). 
12 See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 67-70 (1910); infra note 28. 
13 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52. 
14 See Comment, supra note 8, at 60-61. Environmental statutes that impose strict liability 
include the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1264 (1988); Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriations Act, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(c) (1988) (liability for "negligent" violations). 
15 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1985); United States v. Hayes Int'l 
Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 
F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
16 See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504-05 (presumption that hazardous waste transporters are 
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This Comment examines the situation faced by today's high-level 
corporate officers in light of the Supreme Court's and the Circuit 
Courts' interpretations of the knowledge requirements in public wel-
fare statutes. This Comment argues that, while it is not impossible, 
it is unlikely that any high-level officer in a large corporation could 
be convicted for criminal violations of environmental public welfare 
statutes of which they had no knowledge. 
Section II of this Comment reviews the history of criminal statutes 
and their relationship to requirements of due process of law. 17 Sec-
tion III discusses the origins of both strict-liability public welfare 
statutes and public welfare statutes with knowledge require-
ments. 18 Section IV examines the application of public welfare 
statutes to corporate officers. 19 Finally, in Section V this Comment 
suggests that the trend in corporate officer convictions for 
criminal violations of environmental public welfare statutes 
should not lead to similar convictions of high-level officers in large 
corporations. 20 
II. CRIMINAL STATUTES AND DUE PROCESS 
The general rule at common law was that the prosecution must 
prove scienter, or knowledge, on the part of the defendant in order 
to obtain a criminal conviction. 21 The states adopted this rule into 
statutory crimes,22 and state courts assumed that a scienter element 
was implied in criminal statutes that were silent on the subject. 23 
This rule has been modified, however, with respect to statutes whose 
aware of waste disposal procedures); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670 (jury may infer 
knowledge of permit requirements to corporate officers holding "requisite responsible posi-
tions" with corporate defendant). 
17 See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 35-119 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 120-75 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 176-204 and accompanying text. 
21 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952); United States v. Balint, 
258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922). The exceptions to this rule include sex offenses, such as statutory 
rape, in which the defendant's reasonable belief that the victim had reached the age of consent 
was irrelevant. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 n.8. Other exceptions were offenses of negligence, 
such as involuntary manslaughter, and a wide range of other crimes that arose from an omission 
of duty. [d. Exceptions also included felony murder and adultery. United States v. Crimmins, 
123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941). Much of the reasoning behind the exceptions to the general 
rule was that such conduct is independently immoral or unlawful, and the actor should realize 
that the element of the crime may exist. [d. 
22 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252; Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. 
23 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252; Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52. 
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purpose would be obstructed by the scienter requirement. 24 These 
statutes are commonly referred to as public welfare statutes25 be-
cause the health, safety, and welfare of the public justifies conviction 
without any criminal intent.26 In Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minne-
sota,27 the Supreme Court determined that public welfare statutes 
not containing scienter requirements do not violate due process. 28 
The Supreme Court stated in N ebbia v. New York29 that the 
guarantee of due process "demands only that the law shall not be 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. "30 Although public welfare 
statutes need not contain a scienter requirement, those statutes 
containing the requirement31 are subject to the same standards of 
proof as any other criminal statute.32 The due process clause de-
mands proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
24 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. 
25 Comment, supra note 8, at 61. 
26 See id. 
'Z7 218 U.S. 57 (1910). 
28 See id. at 67-70. In Shevlin-Carpenter, the plaintiffs had violated a state law that forbade 
the removal, without a valid permit, of timber from state lands. [d. at 62-63. The Court 
stated that "public policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts 
it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard 
to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." [d. at 70. 
29 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
30 [d. at 525. The Court fully stated: 
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as 
respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. 
They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end 
shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of 
due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and 
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation 
valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another 
sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness 
of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts. 
[d. (footnotes omitted). 
8) See infra notes 76-119 and accompanying text. The word "knowingly" is commonly used 
in statutes, including public welfare statutes, as the scienter requirement. [d. In United States 
v. Byrd, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved of the following definition of 
"knowingly" given by the trial court in its jury instructions: 
Now, the word "knowingly," as used in the indictment, means that the act or acts 
which were committed by the defendant were done voluntarily and purposely, not 
because of a mistake or inavertence or in good faith. 
Now, the knowledge may be proven by the defendant's conduct and by all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case. 
No person can intentionally avoid knowledge by closing his eyes to facts which 
prompt him to investigate . . . . 
352 F.2d 570, 572 n.1 (2d Cir. 1965). 
32 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985). 
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convict a defendant. 33 This includes proof of criminal intent when it 
is an element of a crime. 34 
III. HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE STATUTES 
A. Strict Liability Public Welfare Statutes 
Although public welfare statutes do not require a scienter element, 
courts have had to determine what statutes may qualify for public 
welfare status. The Supreme Court applied the public welfare ex-
ception that it discussed in Shevlin-Carpenter35 in United States v. 
Dotterweich. 36 In Dotterweich, the federal government charged the 
president and general manager of a pharmaceutical company with 
violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act37 by shipping 
misbranded and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce.38 Al-
though the shipment was a mistake, the Court stated that it is in 
the public interest that the burden of such action should rest on the 
person who acts in relation to a public danger.39 The Court noted 
that a conviction without any criminal intent on the part of the 
wrongdoer might be harsh in some cases, but that the hardship 
should rest with those who have the opportunity to prevent the 
harm, rather than with the innocent public. '10 
The Court further clarified the types of statutes that would be 
deemed public welfare statutes in Morissette v. United States. 41 It 
3.~ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court also stated in support of this 
contention: 
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and 
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the 
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves 
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in 
our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence 
that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without con-
vincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. 
Id. at 364; see also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969). "[C]onvictions so 
totally devoid of evidentiary support violate due process." Id. 
S< Byrd, 352 F.2d at 572-74. 
SIS 218 U.S. 57, 67-70 (1910); see supra note 28. 
36 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
37 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). Section 331(a) prohibits: "The introduction or delivery for 
introduction into interstate commerce of any ... drug ... that is adulterated or misbranded." 
Id. § 331(a). At the time the case was decided, § 333(a) provided that any person who violated 
a provision of section 331 was guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. § 333(a). 
88 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. 
39 I d. at 28l. 
40 See id. at 284-85. 
41 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
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stated that certain statutes implicitly require a showing of intent in 
order to uphold a violation, regardless of whether the statutes ex-
plicitly demand a showing of intent.42 Under Morissette, the distin-
guishing feature of a statute that determines whether proof of intent 
should be required is derivation of the statute from the common 
law. 43 If the statute derives from the common law, then intent should 
be required. 44 If it does not derive from the common law, it is a 
public welfare statute and intent is not required when none is men-
tioned in the statute. 45 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sum-
marized the Morissette analysis and existing case law in Holdridge 
v. United States. 46 In so doing, the court identified a number of 
factors for defining proper public welfare statutes. According to the 
Holdridge court, if a criminal statute imposes strict liability, involves 
a policy matter, imposes a reasonable standard and a small penalty, 
does not derive from the common law, has a supporting congressional 
purpose, and if conviction does not gravely besmirch one's reputa-
tion, then the statute does not require intent and does not violate 
the due process clause. 47 
The Supreme Court applied this analysis in United States v. 
Freed. 48 The Court held that the defendants in Freed violated the 
National Firearms Act49 because they possessed unregistered hand 
grenades. 50 The Court viewed the case as similar to Dotterweich51 
and concluded that the Act as written required neither intent nor 
knowledge that the hand grenades were unregistered. 52 The Court 
noted that the Act was a regulatory measure in the interest of public 
safety and therefore did not require the elements of knowledge or 
intent to uphold a conviction. 53 
42 [d. at 259-63. 
43 See id. at 255-57. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
45 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). 
47 [d. 
48 401 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1971). 
49 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988). The National Firearms Act states: "It shall be unlawful 
for any person to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National 
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." [d. § 5861(d). 
50 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-10. 
51 [d. at 609; see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. The Court stated that the 
National Firearms Act is a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety. The Court 
added that one should not be surprised to learn that the possession of hand grenades is illegal. 
Freed, 401 U.S. at 609. 
52 [d. at 607. 
63 See id. 
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In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided in 
United States v. WulffM that a conviction under the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (MBTA)55 violated the defendant's due process rights 
because the statute lacked a scienter requirement. 56 The court held 
that an element of scienter can be read into a statute lacking such a 
requirement only when that statute is derived from the common 
law. 57 The MBTA, however, was not derived from the common law 
and contained a severe felony provision. 58 Because the WUlff court 
could not read a scienter requirement into the statute, it analyzed 
the constitutionality of the statute. 
The Court of Appeals stated that, according to Holdridge, the due 
process clause would not be violated when the penalty is not severe, 
and the conviction does not gravely besmirch a defendant's reputa-
tion. 59 The court concluded that the penalties under the MBTA were 
not small and that a felony conviction does irreparable damage to 
one's reputation. 60 A felony conviction also results in the loss of one's 
rights to vote, sit on a jury, and possess a firearm. 61 Due to these 
factors, the court determined that the statute failed to meet the 
criteria of the Holdridge test and that imposition of the felony pen-
alty would violate due process. 62 The court determined, therefore, 
that the MBTA is not a public welfare statute because that term is 
used to identify statutes that are constitutional whether or not proof 
of knowledge is required. Congress, therefore, would have to amend 
the statute to include some degree of scienter in order for the statute 
to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. 63 
In United States v. Engler, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit disagreed with the Wulff court's conclusion. 64 The defendants 
in Engler, like the defendant in WUlff, were charged with violating 
the MBTA.65 Unlike the court in WUlff, however, the Engler court 
54 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985). 
56 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988). Before 1986, § 707(b)(2) provided: "Whoever, in violation 
of this subchapter, shall-... sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird 
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more 
than two years, or both." [d. § 707(b)(2). In 1986, Congress substituted "shall knowingly" for 
"shall" in the introductory provisions of the statute. [d. § 707(b). 
56 WUlff, 758 F.2d at 1125. 
57 [d. at 1124. 
58 [d. at 1122. 
59 [d. at 1125. 
60 [d. 
61 [d. at 1123, 1125. 
62 [d. at 1125. 
63 [d.; see supra note 55. 
64 806 F.2d 425, 433 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987). 
65 [d. at 426; see supra note 55. 
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concluded that the statute did not violate the defendants' due process 
rights. 66 Instead, the court decided that, because there were no 
substantial differences between the misdemeanor and felony penal-
ties, the felony provisions did not violate due process. 67 
The court in Engler refused to accept the district court's opinion 
that the differences between a five hundred dollar misdemeanor fine 
and a two thousand dollar felony fine, or a six-month misdemeanor 
sentence and a two-year felony sentence, compelled the conclusion 
that one's reputation would be harmed under the latter penalties but 
not the former. 68 Furthermore, the court cited numerous other cases 
applying strict-criminal-liability statutes that carried penalties equal 
to or more severe than the one at issue, and that had been held 
constitutional by the Supreme Court. 69 
In United States v. Williams,70 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit maintained the approach it had taken in WUlff and again 
required that a statute contain a scienter requirement.71 In Wil-
liams, the court decided that the statutory penalties for transferring 
a firearm that had not been registered in accordance with the pro-
visions of the National Firearms Act72 violated the due process clause 
if the statute did not contain a knowledge requirement. 73 The pen-
alties for such a violation included a possible ten-year prison sentence 
and a ten thousand dollar fine. 74 The court required that a conviction 
must rest on the showing of knowledge that a "firearm," as defined 
in the statute, was being transferred. 75 
66 [d. at 436. 
67 [d. at 434. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. at 435. In United States v. Freed, the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting 
the possession of unregistered firearms, which imposed fines up to $10,000 and/or imprison-
ment up to ten years. 401 U.S. 601 (1971). In United States v. Dotterweich, the Court upheld 
a statute prohibiting the shipment of misbranded or adulterated drugs, which imposed fines 
up to $1000 and/or imprisonment up to one year for a first offense. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). And 
in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the cutting of 
timber on state lands without a valid permit, which imposed fines up to $1000 and/or impris-
onment up to two years. 218 U.S. 57 (1910). 
70 872 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1989). 
71 [d. at 777. 
72 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872. Section 5861(e) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person 
"to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter." [d. § 5861(e). Section 
5841(b) provides: "Each manufacturer, importer, and maker shall register each firearm he 
manufactures, imports, or makes. Each firearm transferred shall be registered to the trans-
feree by the transferor." [d. § 5841(b). 
73 See Williams, 872 F.2d at 777. 
74 [d.; see 26 U.S.C. § 5871. 
75 [d. at 777. 
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B. Public Welfare Statutes with Scienter Requirements 
Unlike the statutes just discussed, there are many public welfare 
statutes that contain explicit scienter requirements. There has been 
much controversy, however, over what type of knowledge must be 
proved for a conviction under these statutes. In United States v. 
International Minerals & Chemical COrp.,76 the Supreme Court 
interpreted a statute that empowered the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to formulate regulations for the safe transportation of 
corrosive liquids. 77 The statute stated that whoever "knowingly vi-
olates any such regulation" shall be fined or imprisoned. 78 The Court 
imputed knowledge to the defendant by deciding that knowledge 
pertained only to the substances and not to the regulation itself. 79 
In other words, knowledge meant knowledge of the substances only 
and not of the regulations. The Court stated that such substances, 
sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid that had been shipped through in-
terstate commerce, are presumably regulated. 80 
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the regulation and 
determined that Congress did not intend to discard the principle 
that ignorance of the law is no excuse when it passed the regulation.81 
In 1960, the Senate had approved an amendment that deleted "know-
ingly" and substituted the language "being aware that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe trans-
portation of explosives and other dangerous articles. "82 The House 
of Representatives refused to agree, however, and stated that its 
version, which ultimately prevailed, would retain the existing lan-
guage. 83 
76 402 u.s. 558 (1971). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (1970) (repealed 1979). 
78 Title 18 of the United States Code provided: "Whoever knowingly violates any such 
regulation shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both 
. . . ." I d. Title 18 also provided: 
The Interstate Commerce Commission shall formulate regulations for the safe 
transportation within the United States of explosives and other dangerous articles, 
including radioactive materials ... flammable liquids ... and poisonous substances, 
which shall be binding upon all carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce 
which transport explosives or other dangerous articles by land . . . . 
Id. § 834(a). 
79 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560-63. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 563. But see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (Court stated that 
when ambiguity exists, criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of leniency). 
82 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 562 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 10-11 (1960» [hereinafter H.R. REP.]. 
88 Id. (citing H.R. REP., supra note 82, at 2). 
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The Court, analyzing the House of Representatives' resistance to 
the Senate amendments, implied that the House may have been 
afraid that the Senate version would result unintentionally in strict 
liability because virtually anyone who was in the business of shipping 
dangerous materials would be deemed to know of the regulations. 84 
The Court refused to conclude, however, that the House was en-
dorsing an ignorance of the law excuse in rejecting strict liability. 85 
Instead, the Court concluded that the legislative history was unclear 
and held that knowledge of facts was required, but not knowledge 
of law. 86 The Court concluded that a person possessing or dealing 
with dangerous products or waste materials must be presumed to 
be aware of any regulations. 87 
Justice Stewart, joined by two other justices,88 wrote a strong 
dissent to Justice Douglas's majority opinion.89 Stewart stated that 
other federal courts have decided this exact issue by holding that 
the statute means exactly what it says.90 Furthermore, Stewart 
examined the legislative history of the statute and noted that 
Congress almost modified the statute because the statute 
required knowledge of the regulations. 91 The statute was not 
84 [d. at 563 (citing H.R. REP., supra note 82, at 2). 
85 [d. 
86 [d. The Court stated that a "person thinking in good faith that he was shipping distilled 
water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered. " [d. at 563-
64. In further support of why knowledge of facts is important, the Court stated that: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention 
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems 
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of 
the normal individual to choose between good and evil. 
[d. at 564 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). 
87 [d. at 565. The Court compared this case with Balint and Freed because dangerous 
products or waste materials were involved. In such situations, the probability of regulation 
is so large that anyone who knows that they are dealing with such substances must be 
presumed to be aware of the regulation. [d. 
88 Justices Harlan and Brennan joined Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion. [d. at 565-69 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
89 [d. "[IJt is evident to me that Congress made punishable only knowing violations of the 
regulation in question. That is what the law quite clearly says, what the federal courts have 
held, and what the legislative history confirms." [d. at 565 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
00 [d. at 566 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "[TJhe words 'knowingly violates any such regulation' 
mean no more and no less than 'knowingly violates any such regulation.''' [d. (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). "'[l]t would seem that a person could not knowingly violate a 
regulation unless he knows of the terms of the regulation and knows that what he is doing is 
contrary to the regulation.'" [d. at 566-67 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting St. Johnsbury 
Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393,398 (1st Cir. 1955) (Magruder, C.J., concurring)). 
91 [d. at 567 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart thought that the Senate clearly 
stated that the statute required knowledge of the regulations when it stated: 
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modified,92 however, but retained the word "knowingly. "93 Thus, 
Stewart argued, the statute retained the knowledge of the regula-
tions requirement. 94 Justice Stewart stated that the Court granted 
to the executive branch exactly what Congress refused to grant in 
1960.95 The result is that a person who had never heard of the 
regulation might make a single shipment and be guilty of a criminal 
offense punishable by a year in prison. 96 
In contrast to the International Minerals court, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit decided in United States v. Johnson 
& Towers, Inc.,97 that the knowledge requirement in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)98 required both knowledge 
Prosecution for violations of the Commission's transportation of explosives regu-
lations has been extremely difficult because of the requirement in section 835 of the 
act that violators must have knowledge that they violated the Commission's regula-
tions. While the committee believes that every reasonable precaution should be taken 
to provide for punishing those violating a statute whose purpose is to promote safety, 
the creation of an absolute liability is deemed too stringent. 
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 901, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2--3 (1960)) 
(emphasis added). 
92 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
93 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 568 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
... I d. (Stewart, J., dissenting). The House summarized the status of the statute as follows: 
The present Transportation and Explosives Act requires that a violation "know-
ingly" be committed before penalty may be inflicted for such violation. Under the 
present law there is judicial pronouncement as to the standards of conduct that make 
a violation a "knowing" violation. The instant bill would change substantially the 
quantum of proof necessary to prove a violation since it provides that "any person 
who being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regula-
tions for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles" is guilty 
if there is a noncompliance with the regulations. Such language may well create an 
almost absolute liability for violation .... Since the penalties prescribed for violation 
of the Explosives Act are substantial and since proof required to sustain a charge of 
violation of such regulations under the bill would require little more than proof that 
the violation occurred, it is the considered opinion of the committee that such a 
substantial departure in present law is not warranted. It is the purpose of this 
a,mendment to retain the present law by providing that a person must "knowingly" 
violate the regulations. 
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP., supra note 82, at 2--3) (emphasis added). 
95 I d. (Stewart, J., dissenting). "I cannot join the Court in this exercise, requiring as it 
does such a total disregard of plain statutory language, established judicial precedent, and 
explicit legislative history." I d. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
96 I d. at 569 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
97 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
98 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988) [hereinafter RCRAj. Before 1984, § 6928(d) provided: 
Any person who -
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this subchapter either -
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title ... or 
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit 
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of the regulation and knowledge that the regulation had been vio-
lated. 99 The defendants in Johnson & Towers were charged with 
violating RCRA by pumping hazardous wastes into a trench that 
flowed into a creek. lOO Under RCRA, the company was required to 
obtain a permit for such disposal. 101 Johnson & Towers, however, 
had neither applied for, nor been issued, such a permit.102 The court 
concluded that for a conviction, the jury must determine that each 
defendant knew that a permit was required and knew that the 
company did not have a permit. 103 The court came to this conclusion 
by analyzing the statutory language and noting that, unlike the 
statute in International Minerals, RCRA contains a "knowingly" 
requirement both at the beginning and at the end of the statute. 104 
The only Supreme Court case during the last decade dealing with 
the knowledge and intent issue of criminal statutes is Liparota v. 
United States. l05 In Liparota, the defendant was charged with vio-
lating a federal statute governing food stamp fraud. l06 The case 
focused on whether it was necessary to prove that the defendant 
had knowledge that he was violating the statute.107 Based on the 
express language of the statute requiring knowledge,108 and on the 
reality that food stamps were not dangerous substances that needed 
regulation in the same manner as hand grenades or adulterated 
drugs, the Court found that knowledge of the statute was required 
for a conviction under it. 109 
... shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 ... for each 
day of violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year ... , or both ... . 
Id. § 6928(d). In 1984 some minor changes were made to the wording of these provisions, and 
the penalties were increased to $50,000 for each day of violation or two years of imprisonment 
or both. Id. § 6928. 
99 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669. 
100 Id. at 664. 
101 Id.; see also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925. 
102 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. 
103 Id. at 669. 
104 See id. at 668-69; see also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). The legislative history of this 
section of RCRA lends support to the court's conclusion. The House stated that "[t]he use of 
criminal penalties are sufficiently narrow" because "they only apply to those who knowingly 
transport hazardous waste to a facility which does not have a permit." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976). 
105 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
106 Id. at 420-21; The Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (1988). 
107 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 421. 
lOB The Food Stamp Act of 1977 provides, in relevant part, that: "[W]hoever knowingly 
uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner 
not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such 
coupons or authorization cards are of a value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony . . . ." 7 
U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l). 
109 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
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The Court justified its interpretation of "knowingly" by stating 
that when the congressional purpose of a statute is unclear, it should 
be resolved in the way most favorable to the defendant. 110 The Court 
stated, however, that the prosecution need prove neither actual 
knowledge of specific regulations nor the defendant's state of mind. 111 
Instead, the defendant's knowledge that his conduct was unauthor-
ized or illegal may be inferred from the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the case. 112 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar 
decision in United States v. Hayes International COrp.ll3 In Hayes, 
the defendants were convicted of violating RCRA 114 by shipping 
hazardous waste to a non-permitted facility. 115 The court determined 
that the knowledge requirement applied to the permit status of the 
facility, as well as to the material being transported. 116 The court 
ruled that not applying the knowledge requirement to this element 
might criminalize innocent conduct.117 It further stated that, if Con-
gress had intended such a strict statute, Congress could have 
dropped the requirement that the defendant knowingly violate the 
statute. 118 As in Liparota, however, the Hayes court held that the 
burden of proving knowledge was minimal and could be accomplished 
with circumstantial evidence. 119 
In interpreting statutes without a scienter requirement, courts 
must determine if the statutes are public welfare statutes and there-
fore do not violate the due process clause. Statutes that do contain 
a scienter requirement, however, require courts to decide exactly 
what type of knowledge needs to be proven. Thus far, courts have 
not imposed very high burdens to satisfy their standards for proving 
knowledge. 
110 See id. at 427. The Court also stated: "[Blecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, 
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, 
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity." [d. (quoting United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971». 
111 [d. at 434. 
112 [d. 
118 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k). Section 6928(d)(I) provides criminal sanctions for: "Any 
person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this subchapter .. , ." 
[d. § 6928(d)(I). 
116 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 150l. 
116 [d. at 1504. 
117 [d. The court gave as an example a defendant who reasonably might believe that a site 
had a permit, but in fact had been misled by the people at the site. [d. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
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IV. PUBLIC WELFARE STATUTES AND CORPORATE OFFICER 
LIABILITY 
A. Application of Strict-Liability Public Welfare Statutes to 
C or'Porate Officers 
Although public welfare statutes have been in existence since the 
early part of the twentieth century, application of these statutes to 
high-level corporate officers is a relatively new phenomenon. United 
States v. Park,120 decided after Dotterweich, established the respon-
sibility of corporate officers for violations of strict-liability public 
welfare statutes. Park involved a violation of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act121 by Acme Markets, a national retail food 
chain. 122 The chain employed about thirty-six thousand employees 
and had 874 retail outlets, twelve general warehouses, and four 
special warehouses. 123 The corporate headquarters, including the 
office of the defendant, who was the president and chief executive 
officer of the corporation, were located in Philadelphia. The corpo-
ration and the defendant were charged with allowing food that was 
received via interstate commerce and held for sale in a Baltimore 
warehouse, to be stored in a building accessible to, and contaminated 
by, rodents. 124 
The president of Acme had been notified by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) of the unsanitary conditions at the Baltimore 
warehouse after a twelve-day inspection. 125 Several months later, 
however, a second inspection was conducted, and the FDA found 
that the situation had not been rectified completely.126 Furthermore, 
the president admitted at trial that he had delegated authority over 
the situation to his subordinates, but that he was responsible for all 
of the operations of the company. 127 The Court summarized the long 
120 421 U. S. 658 (1975). 
121 21 U.S.C.§§ 301--393. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits: 
The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or 
any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, 
drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale 
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in 
such article being adulterated or misbranded. 
[d. § 331(k). 
122 Park, 421 U.S. at 660. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. 
125 [d. at 661-62. 
126 [d. at 662. 
127 [d. at 664-65. 
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history of public welfare statute cases and stated that responsible 
corporate officers may be held criminally accountable. 128 The Court 
held that those corporate officers who are in the requisite positions 
of responsibility have "a positive duty to seek out and remedy vio-
lations when they occur, "129 as well as "a duty to implement measures 
that will insure that violations will not occur. "130 
The Park Court stated that, while defendants can claim that they 
were powerless to prevent or correct a violation, defendants carry 
the burden of proving their powerlessness. 131 The government, how-
ever, still carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a defendant had the requisite power and position to prevent or 
correct the violation. 132 The Park Court held that corporate officers 
are accountable because of the responsibilities and authority of their 
positions, and not merely because of the title of their positions. 133 It 
is their responsibilities and authority that are the determinative 
factors in delineating officer liability. 134 
A similar case was decided one year after Park in United States 
v. Starr.135 Cheney Brothers Food Corporation and its secretary-
treasurer, Dean Starr, were charged with violating the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act136 after food stored in a company 
warehouse became contaminated. 137 Starr was responsible for the 
operation of the warehouse. 138 Although Starr told the warehouse 
janitor to repair the situation, Starr never inspected to see that the 
janitor had actually repaired the situation. 139 An entire month later, 
the FDA conducted a second inspection, and the janitor had not 
128 See id. at 670-73. 
129 Id. at 672. 
130 Id. The Court also stated that '''[tlhe accused, if he does not will the violation, usually 
is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no 
more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.'" Id. 
at 671 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952». In support of the high 
standards that it was setting, the Court stated that, although the requirements of foresight 
and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate officers are demanding, they are no more 
strict than the public has a right to expect. I d. at 672. These corporate officers voluntarily 
assume their positions in businesses whose services and products affect the health and well-
being of the general public. I d. 
131 I d. at 673. 
132 Id. 
133 I d. at 675. 
134 See id. 
135 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976). 
136 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393; see supra note 12l. 
137 Starr, 535 F.2d at 514. 
138 Id. at 514-15. 
139 Id. at 515-16. 
372 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:357 
corrected the situation. 140 The court found Starr liable because he 
had ample time between inspections to cure the violative conditions 
that existed. 141 
B. Application of Environmental Public Welfare Statutes with 
Scienter Requirements to Corporate Officers 
Four recent cases have resulted in the conviction of corporate 
officers for violating environmental public welfare statutes contain-
ing a knowledge requirement. These cases show that corporate of-
ficers will be held liable when they participate in or have knowledge 
of environmental statute violations. In United States v. Frezzo 
Bros. ,142 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
convictions of two individuals, Guido and James Frezzo, for violating 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.143 The Act prohibited the 
willful or negligent discharge of pollutants. 144 Each individual defen-
dant received a thirty-day jail sentence, and their combined fines 
totaled fifty thousand dollars. 145 The Frezzos' corporation, a mush-
room-farming business, produced a manure compost to help grow 
mushrooms. Water runoff from compost wharves was collected and 
stored in a holding tank that, when it rained, often overflowed into 
a separate storm water runoff system that carried rain water to a 
tributary of a creek. 146 
The evidence showed that the brothers knew that the holding tank 
could contain the water only ninety-five percent of the time. 147 The 
court stated that a jury could infer from the totality of the circum-
stances that a willful act had occurred. 148 The court added that it 
was not necessary to show that some action was taken, such as the 
opening of a valve, to establish a willful violation of the Act. 149 
140 Id. at 514. 
141 Id. at 515-16. 
142 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). 
143 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
Section 1311(a) provides: "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful." Id. § 1311(a). Before 1987, § 1319(c) provided: "(1) Any person who willfully or 
negligently violates section 1311 ... of this title ... shall be punished by a fine of not less 
than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 
one year, or by both .... " Id. § 1319(c). This section was amended in 1987, and the word 
"wilfully" was deleted. Id. § 1319. 
144 [d. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c). 
146 Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1124. 
14. [d. at 1125. 
147 [d. 
148 Id. at 1129. 
149 Id. 
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Similarly, in United States v. Wardl50 the defendant, the chairman 
of the board of Ward Transformer Company, was convicted of a 
"willful" violation under the Toxic Substances Control Act151 for 
unlawfully disposing toxic substances152 and for aiding and abetting 
the unlawful disposal of toxic substances. l53 The defendant was con-
victed because of the corporation's scheme to dispose of oil laced 
with polychlorinated biphenyl by spraying it on the ground. l54 Al-
though Ward himself did not perform the acts of disposing the oil, 155 
he approved the plan and suggested dump sites. 156 Furthermore, 
Ward's employees assisted in carrying out the illegal acts,157 and 
Ward's company performed all the work on a truck designed to dump 
the oil. l58 Ward was advised daily on the progress of the oil disposal 
until all of the oil was removed from his plant. Given those facts, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that there 
was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that Ward was an active 
participant in the illegal disposal of the oil. 159 
Another corporate officer was convicted for violating an environ-
mental statute in United States v. Greer. 160 The operator of a waste-
recycling and transportation business was cp.arged with illegally 
dumping hazardous waste161 in violation of RCRA,162 as well as fail-
ure to report the dumping163 in violation of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).I64 In connection with its waste-recycling and transportation 
160 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1982). 
161 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988). 
162 See id. §§ 2605, 2614. 
168 See Title 18 of the United States Code, which provides: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him 
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). 
164 Ward, 676 F.2d at 95. 
165 See id. at 95-96. 
166 See id. at 95. 
167 Id. 
168 I d. at 96. 
169 Id. at 97. 
160 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988). 
161 Id. at 1448. 
162 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A); see supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
163 Greer, 850 F.2d at 1448. 
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA provides that: 
[a]ny person-... 
(3) in charge of a facility from which a hazardous substance is released, other than 
a federally permitted release, in a quantity equal to or greater than that determined 
pursuant to section 9602 of this title who fails to notify immediately the appropriate 
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business at one location, Greer's company also stored and recycled 
wastes at a second location. 165 Greer himself was involved actively 
in the daily operation at the second location and supervised the 
employees who worked there. 
Greer's plant manager occasionally dumped wastes directly onto 
the ground in order to keep the number of drums of waste below 
1300, in accordance with a local ordinance. 166 According to the plant 
manager, Greer approved of this and expressly stated, "[W]ell, we 
got to keep this drum count down."167 Another employee testified 
that she once overheard Greer tell employees that "a rainy day is a 
good day to get your drum count down. "168 Although there was no 
evidence that Greer directly told anyone to dump the waste, the 
court concluded that a jury could infer from the evidence that Greer 
had knowingly disposed of, or caused others to dispose of, the haz-
ardous waste. 169 
In another case, a court held mid-level managers liable for violat-
ing a statute with a knowledge requirement. In United States v. 
Johnson & Towers,17O the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
decided that mid-level managers could be held criminally liable for 
violating RCRA.171 These individual employees supervised and di-
rected the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. 172 
The Johnson & Towers court concluded that under RCRA, em-
ployees, as well as owners or operators of the facility, could be held 
responsible if they "knew or should have known" that there had not 
been compliance with RCRA's permit requirement. 173 The court 
stated that the effectiveness of the statute would be severely limited 
if only owners and operators could be held responsible when others, 
such as employees, also have substantial responsibility for handling 
regulated materials.174 The court summarized its holding by stating 
agency of the United States Government as soon as he has knowledge of such release 
. . . shall, upon conviction, be fined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
title 18 or imprisoned for not more than 3 years . . . or both . . . . 
[d. § 9603(b)(3). 




169 [d. at 1452. 
170 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); see supra notes 97-104 
and accompanying text. 
171 [d. at 665; see RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). 
172 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. 
173 [d. at 664-65. 
174 [d. at 667. 
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that any knowledge, including knowledge of the permit requirement, 
"may be inferred by the jury as to those individuals who hold the 
requisite responsible positions with the corporate defendant. "175 
V. THE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT HIGH-LEVEL OFFICERS IN LARGE 
CORPORATIONS WILL BE CONVICTED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMES WITHOUT ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Park176 makes 
it clear that corporate officers will be held liable for environmental 
crimes when they are in positions to prevent or correct violations of 
strict-liability statutes and fail to do SO.177 Thus, under Park, cor-
porate officers may be held criminally liable without actual knowl-
edge of such violations. It seems doubtful, however, that this poten-
tial liability will reach high-level officers in large corporations who 
have no knowledge of any violations of environmental public welfare 
statutes that include knowledge requirements. 178 To convict such 
corporate officers would be a violation of their due process rights179 
because of the explicit requirement in these statutes that knowledge 
be proven for a conviction. 
The cases applying these environmental statutes support this 
proposition. The corporate officers held criminally liable in Frezzo 
Bros. were the owners of a small family business and were aware of 
the waste overflow. 180 In Ward, the evidence was clear that the 
defendant corporate officer had been an active participant in the 
planning and approval of the illegal scheme to dispose of the toxic 
substance. 181 The corporate officer in Greer was actively involved in 
the operation of the businesss, and there was substantial evidence 
that he approved of the illegal dumping of wastes. 182 These cases, 
175 I d. at 670. 
176 421 U.S. 658 (1975); see supra notes 120--34 and accompanying text. 
177 See Park, 421 U.S. at 673. 
178 These statutes include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1361(b)(1)-(2) (1988) ("knowingly"); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1988) 
("knowingly or willfully"); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)-(4) (1988) ("knowingly"); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(e) (1988) ("knowingly"); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)-(2) (1988) ("knowingly"); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988) ("knowledge"). 
179 See supra notes 29--34 and accompanying text. 
180 United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1074 (1980); see supra notes 14~9 and accompanying text. 
181 United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94, 95-97 (4th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 150--59 and 
accompanying text. 
182 United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 160-69 
and accompanying text. 
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therefore, all involve corporate officers who were either actively 
involved in, or aware of, or in a clear position to be aware of, the 
violations that occurred. 
Nevertheless, there are two cases that could be used to support 
the proposition that high-level officers in large corporations could be 
convicted for environmental crimes even if they do not have actual 
knowledge of the violations. There are strong reasons, however, 
why these two cases, United States v. International Minerals & 
Chemical COrp.l83 and United States v. Johnson & Towers,l84 do not 
have much impact. 
In International Minerals,l85 the Supreme Court failed to distin-
guish a statute with an explicit knowledge requirement as being any 
different from a strict-liability statute. 186 The Court's decision that 
the words "knowingly violates any such regulation" referred only to 
knowledge of facts or the hazardousness of the materials, and not to 
law or the regulation itself, defied logic and the statutory history. 
This reading of the statute made it a strict-liability statute except 
for the extremely rare situation in which someone ships a hazardous 
substance thinking it is harmless. The Court's interpretation of the 
statute is unreasonable because while the Court acknowledged that 
Congress did not want to create strict-liability,187 the Court's decision 
effectively imposed a strict-liability standard. Justice Stewart, in his 
dissent, harshly criticized the majority opinion. ISS 
If knowledge of the law is required in this statute, then those who 
regularly ship hazardous materials will have a difficult time proving 
that they were unaware of the regulations. 189 It is the person who 
is unaware of the regulations and may be shipping regulated material 
for the first and only time who would be protected by the statute if 
knowledge of law were required. 190 The Court's reluctance to create 
an ignorance of the law excuse was unfounded because the only 
people who would be affected are those who have never dealt with 
such hazardous materials before. It is these people that the statute 
was designed to protect by the inclusion of the word "knowingly. "191 
183 402 u.s. 558 (1971); see supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text. 
184 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); see supra notes 97-104, 
170-75 and accompanying text. 
185 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
186 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
187 [d. at 562-63. 
188 See id. at 565-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
189 [d. at 569 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
190 [d. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
191 See S. REP. No. 901, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess. 2 (1960); see also supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text. 
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The decision in International Minerals would pose a problem for 
a corporate officer whose corporation shipped hazardous materials, 
without the corporate officer's knowledge, in violation of the statute. 
In such a situation, the corporate officer could be held liable under 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine discussed in Park.192 Such 
a corporate officer could be held criminally liable for the statutory 
violation although the officer had absolutely no knowledge of the 
events. The statute involved in International Minerals, however, is 
different from most environmental statutes because the Court read 
it to be virtually a strict-liability statute. In cases since International 
Minerals, courts have not read environmental statutes so narrowly, 
and no high-level corporate officers have been convicted without 
knowledge of statutory violations. 193 
The other case that has left a small opening for courts to apply a 
stricter standard to environmental public welfare statutes with 
knowledge requirements is Johnson & Towers, decided by the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 194 The Johnson & Towers court 
used language describing potential corporate officer liability195 that 
is extremely similar to the language used by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. ParkYJ6 By stating that those who "should have 
known"197 based on their "requisite responsible positions"198 can be 
prosecuted, the Johnson & Towers court's standard approached the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine that was laid out by the Su-
preme Court in Park.199 Park, however, concerned a strict-liability 
public welfare statute containing no knowledge requirement. In con-
trast, the Johnson & Towers court applied a similar standard to a 
statute that the court determined required both knowledge of a 
permit requirement and knowledge that the requirement had not 
been met. 200 
When examined closely, however, the Johnson & Towers opinion 
really does not support convictions of corporate officers lacking 
knowledge, for the violation of statutes containing a knowledge re-
quirement. First, the words "knew or should have known," concern-
ing compliance with the permit requirement, were used by the court 
192 See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 113-19, 142-75 and accompanying text. 
liN 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), eert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
196 [d. at 665, 670. 
196 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). 
197 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665. 
196 [d. at 670. 
199 See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
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when it discussed the potential liability for employees who "know-
ingly treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste."201 Second, it 
is not unusual to allow a jury to infer the elements of a crime, so 
that allowing the jury to infer knowledge based on a person's "req-
uisite responsible position" is not wrong. The jury may infer knowl-
edge from many factors that comprise circumstantial evidence.202 
Third, the defendants in Johnson & Towers were not high-level 
corporate officers but were mid-level managers who were directly 
involved with the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes. 203 
The Park Court dealt specifically with corporate officer liability 
and imposed the "highest standard of foresight and vigilance" on 
corporate officers.204 To read the Johnson & Towers opinion so 
broadly would be innacurate and unjustified considering the facts of 
the case and that this was a circuit court opinion that has not resulted 
in the conviction of high-level corporate officers for environmental 
crimes of which they had no knowledge. 
High-level corporate officers in large corporations usually are not 
involved with the daily operations of the corporation's divisions, 
offices, factories, and warehouses. They may set corporate policy 
regarding these operations, but it is unrealistic to expect them to 
have actual knowledge of daily events. These officers can be con-
victed of environmental crimes requiring proof of knowledge, how-
ever, if juries find that the officers knew about statutory violations 
or shut their eyes to the violations. Jurors can infer such knowledge 
based on the surrounding circumstances. 
If high-level corporate officers do not have any knowledge of the 
violations that occurred, however, then juries will not convict them 
for violating statutes that require proof of knowledge because that 
would violate their due process rights. The responsible corporate 
officer doctrine discussed by the Supreme Court in Park cannot be 
applied to such officers when the violated statute contains a knowl-
edge requirement. This means that those directly responsible for 
compliance with environmental statutes will be the ones held ac-
countable. This seems to have been the intent of Congress when it 
passed these statutes because strict liability was not imposed. While 
201 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65. 
202 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985); see supra notes 105-12 and accom-
panying text; see also United States v. Hayes Int'J Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 
1986); see supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. 
208 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. 
204 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). 
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this will insulate high-level corporate officers from criminal convic-
tions, it actually should promote compliance with environmental stat-
utes by corporate employees. Those whose job duties involve com-
plying with environmental statutes will be less likely to cut corners 
if they know that they will be the only ones criminally charged. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most federal environmental statutes contain knowledge require-
ments. The corporate officers who have been convicted under these 
statutes either have been active participants in the violations or 
have had knowledge of the violations. High-level officers in large 
corporations have not been convicted under these statutes because, 
without knowledge of the violations, a criminal conviction would 
violate their due process rights. Unless these laws are changed, it 
is unlikely that any high-level corporate officers can be convicted 
criminally for statutory violations by the corporation's employees. 
This result should actually decrease the likelihood of environmental 
statute violations, however, because mid-level managers and em-
ployees should know that they, and not their superiors, will be 
convicted criminally for their wrongful acts. 
